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What Is the Matter with Equality?: An
Assessment of the Equal Treatment of
Religion and Nonreligion in First
Amendment Jurisprudence
WLLIAM P. IARSHALL"
The one point on which all the participants in this Symposium agree is that
current Supreme Court decisions interpreting the religion clause are heavily
influenced by equality considerations. The Court, with limited exception, has
indicated that, for constitutional purposes, religion should be treated equally with
nonreligion.' This means that religion will generally not be constitutionally entitled
to benefits unavailable to nonreligion, nor will itbe denied benefits that are generally
available to nonreligion.
There has also been remarkable consensus, thus far, about the wisdom of the
Court's approach. It has pleased absolutely no one. To some, the equality approach
does not sufficiently protect religion, to others it is too deferential to religion, and to
still others it assumes its own conclusions by facilely positing that religion and
nonreligion canbe meaningfully equated. Daniel Conlde's remarks may also reflect
a general consensus when he argues that the equality approach is deficient because
it devalues religion by not according it with the recognition that it is both "distinct
and distinctly important"
2
The Court's approach, accordingly, is in dire need of a defender, and it is in
precisely that role that I intend to fill in this Article. I do so for two reasons. First,
although I do not necessarily ascribe to every aspect of an equality approach, I
believe that, at least in its current form, it sensibly furthers religious liberty interests.
Second, and relatedly, I also believe that the Court's reliance on this approach has
promoted a stability in the case law that itself furthers religion clause goals.
Part I of this Article will briefly discuss the case law to show how equality
concerns have influenced religion clause decisions. Part II will utilize the example
of free exercise to illustrate how substantive policy reasons may support the equality
approach. Part H will present the juridical concerns with adjudicating religion as
a distinct phenomenon that militate in favor of treating religion and nonreligion
equally. Part IV will address how the equality approach may promote jurisprudential
stability within the religion clauses. Part V will offer a brief conclusion.
Before proceeding further, however, three points need to be introduced to place the
equality approach in perspective. One, the Supreme Court's tact in pursuing an
equality approach is not new. Rather, as shall be discussed, it has pervaded modem
* Galen J. Roush Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University Law School. I am
grateful to the participants at the Symposium at Indiana University entitled "Religious Liberty
at the Dawn of a New Millennium" for their insights and criticisms of an earlier draft of this
Article. I would also like to thank Professor Joanne Brant for her helpful comments and
Lindsey Carr for her research assistance.
1. Less controversially, the jurisprudence also reflects a principle of equality among
religions-meaning that the government must treat all religions equally. See Larson v.
Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244-45 (1982).
2. Daniel 0. Conkle, The Uncertain Future ofReligious Liberty: Formal Neutrality and
Little More?, 75 IND. L.J. 1, 5 (2000).
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religion clause jurisprudence virtually from its inception.3 The only new
development, if any, is that in some cases the role of equality has become more
explicit. Two, the role of equality is not absolute. There are numerous areas within
the religion clause jurisprudence where religion/nonreligion equality has no part at
all.4 Three, the role of equality in religion clause cases should not be exaggerated
even in situations where it is in play. In some of these circumstances, for example,
the use of equality as a rule of decision has been either explicitly or implicitly
rejected.' The role of equality in religion clause cases, accordingly, is more
accurately described as a vehicle that works as a center of gravity, assuring that the
constitutional status of religion does not veer too far in any one direction.'
I. THE ROLE OF EQUALITY IN RELIGION CLAUSE DECISIONS
A. Introduction
A superficial review of current religion clause jurisprudence would likely lead to
the conclusion that the area is in tumult. There is no underlying theory of religious
freedom that has captured a majority of the Court, and the Court's commitment to
its announced doctrines is tenuous at best. Every new case accepted for argument
presents the very real possibility that the Court might totally abandon its previous
efforts and start over.
As Kent Greenawalt observes, the tests applied by the United States Supreme
Court in religion clause cases are "in nearly total disarray."' The compelling interest
test that the Court initially set forth in Sherbert v. Verner' as applicable to free
3. See infra text accompanying notes 26-50; see also Pm.LT KURLAND, REIGION AND
THE LAW oF CHURCH AND STATE AND THE SUPREME CouRT 17-18 (1962) (arguing that the
religion clauses should be interpreted to prohibit the state from using religion as a basis of
classification for governmental action). Kurland's position, in effect, was an earlier version
of the equality approach-religion should not be constitutionally differentiated from
nonreligion. See also Mark Tushnet, The Constitution of Religion, 18 CONN. L. REv. 701,
712-13 (1986) (noting how the Court's religion clause jurisprudence has tended to follow
either a "reduction" principle in which religion is seen as indistinguishable from other forms
ofbelief, ora 'marginality' principle, in which religion is distinguished from nonreligion only
to the extent that such distinction holds no significant consequences).
4. See infra text accompanying notes 51-60.
5. See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707,713 (1981) (holding that the Free Exercise
Clause protects only religious and not moral or philosophical beliefs). Thomas remains good
law. Although the compelling interest test under which Thomas was decided has since been
held inapplicable to neutral laws of general application, see Employment Div. v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872, 884-85 (1990), the test still applies in cases like Thomas, in which the state has set
up a system of individualized exemptions that does not allow for religious claims.
Incidentally, even Smith, the case that rejected the continued use of the compelling interest
test, did not do so in the name of promoting religion/nonreligion equality interests. Id. at 886.
6. For this reason, I shall use the term "equality approach" rather than "equality
principle" throughout this Article.
7. Kent Greenawalt, Quo Vadis: The Status andProspects of "Tests" Under the Religion
Clauses, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 323, 323.
8. 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
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exercise challenges was overturned in Employment Division v. Smith,9 at least in so
far as that test was to be applied in assessing First Amendment attacks on neutrally
applicable laws. Smith, in turn, has generated its own confusion as lower courts have
struggled to determine the bounds of the various exceptions that the Court
announced would still warrant compelling interest.1
Meanwhile, the Court's Establishment Clause test, while not suffering the
indignity of being directly overruled, has not fared much better. The Court's test,
originally set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman," has been weakened, 2 recharacterized, 3
or simply not applied 4 in recent decisions. Indeed, the test is so unpredictable that
in a recent case the Court took the unprecedented step of overruling a decision that
it had reached under Lemon 5 based on the grounds that its original holding had been
undercut by later cases.' 6 The Court took this step, moreover,'while adhering to
Lemon as still providing the applicable law.
Even amidst this doctrinal tumult, however, scholars have noted that there is more
consistency in religion clausejurisprudence than meets the eye. For example, while
virtually everybody agrees that Smith's abandonment of the compelling interest test
in free exercise cases was a major event in religion clause jurisprudence, 7 nobody
argues that Smith signaled a major change in the results of free exercise cases.
Sherbert's compelling interest test had neverbeen given much vitalityby the Court, 8
9. 494 U.S. at 884-85.
10. The Smith Court held, for example, that strict scrutiny would continue to apply in so-
called hybrid cases in which the free exercise interest was combined with another
constitutional right Id. at 881-82; see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214-15 (1972).
It would also apply in cases in which the state has in place a system of individualized
exemptions but refuses to extend that system to cases ofreligious hardship. See Sherbert, 374
U.S. at 404. Later cases have also had to interpret the meaning of what, under Smith, is a
"neutrally applicable" law. See Church ofthe Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of lialeah, 508
U.S. 520, 533-34, 540-42 (1993).
11. 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). The Lemon test requires that in order to survive
Establishment Clause scrutiny, a challenged enactment must: (1) have a secular purpose, (2)
have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and (3) not foster excessive
government entanglement with religion. Id.
12. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 218-36 (1997) (recognizing substantial changes
in the Court's Establishment Clause case law which allowed for the lifting of a twelve-year-
old injunction against New York City public schools).
13. See, e.g., County ofAllegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (characterizing Lemon
as a non-endorsement test).
14. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 840-42
(1995). Greenawalt also observes that "Lemon has ceased to operate as a general
Establishment Clause test." Greenawalt, supra note 7, at 359.
15. See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402,410-14 (1985), overruled by Agostini v. Felton,
521 U.S. 203 (1997).
16. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 237.
17. See Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57
U. CIm.L.REv. 1109, 1110-11 (1990).
18. See James E. Ryan, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An
Iconoclastic Assessment, 78 VA. L. REv. 1407, 1412 (1992).
2000]
INDIANA LA WJOURNAL
and its doctrinal abandonment in Smith simply echoed the actual results in the
cases. 19
Similarly, the Establishment Clause may yield more consistency than is popular
to admit. Writing separately, Carl Esbeck20 and Robert Sedler2' have canvassed the
cases and found enough consistency to conclude that a settled restatement of
Establishment Clause law can be gleaned from the Court's decisions. The results of
the religion clause cases, in sum, suggest an unexpected stability inthejurisprudence
that would otherwise not be evident if one were to study only the tests and theories
which the Court ostensibly used to reach those results.
This is not to say that religion clause cases are models of clarity. Free exercise
jurisprudence, after all, is the area that gave us the rather unique and impenetrable
notion of "hybrid rights."' Establishment jurisprudence, meanwhile, has been
frustrating. The Court's establishment decisions, for example, have maintained that
there is a constitutional difference between the state providing textbooks to parochial
school children and the state providing maps to themP and that the constitutionality
of nativity scenes at city hall depends on whether the display is accompanied by
secular symbols or is free standing.24 But, even if the religion clause cases have
provided problematic and, at times, comical distinctions, the central observation is
correct. There is a general, discernible pattern that emerges from the case law. This
pattern suggests the Court has implicitly been guided by a general notion of
equality-both equality between religions and between religion and nonreligion.
B. Religion/NonReligion Equality
The equality principle is straight-forward. On one side, the Court has been
reluctant to grant (or to allow) religion greater benefit than that provided to
nonreligion. On the other, the Court has been reluctant to disfavor religion vis-A-vis
its secular counterparts.
The pervasiveness of the equality theme in religion clause jurisprudence is not a
19. See Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problems ofBurdens on the Free Exercise
of Religion, 102 HIv. L. REV. 933, 944 (1989) (noting that courts have not applied the
compelling interest test with full rigor).
20. See Carl H. Esbeck, A Restatement of the Supreme Court'sLaw ofReligious Freedom:
Coherence, Conflict, or Chaos?, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 581 (1995).
21. See Robert A. Sedler, Understanding the Establishment Clause: The Perspective of
Constitutional Litigation, 43 WAYNE L. REV. 1317 (1997).
22. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881-82 (1990). For a telling critique ofthe
concept of hybrid rights as used in Smith, see James D. Gordon III, Free Exercise on the
Mountaintop, 79 CAL. L. REv. 91, 98-99 (1991).
23. The former, according to the Court, are permissible while the latter are not Compare
Board ofEduc. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248-49 (1968) (upholding a state funded textbook loan
program for parochial school students), with Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 366, 372
(1975) (striking down a state funded program that loaned maps and other instructional
materials to parochial school students).
24. This distinction has been referred to as "the two plastic reindeer rule." Richard S.
Myers, Reflections on the Teaching of Civic Virtue in the Pubic Schools, 74 U. DET. MERCY
L. REv. 63, 64 (1996).
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new development Consider the Free Exercise Clause. In the 1944 case Prince v.
Massachusetts,' the Court faced a free exercise challenge from a Jehovah's Witness
to an ordinance which restricted the rights of children to engage. in door-to-door
solicitation. The Witness acknowledged that she would not be entitled to relief from
the ordinance under the Free Speech Clause but claimed that the religious nature of
her claim entitled her to constitutional relief nevertheless. In equality-laden
language, the Court rejected her claim:
If bythis position appellant seeks for freedom of conscience abroaderprotection
than for freedom of the mind, it may be doubted that any of the great liberties
insured by the First Article can be given higher place than the others. All have
preferred position in our basic scheme. All are interwoven there together.
Differences there are, in them and in the modes appropriate for their exercise.
But they have unity in the charter's prime place because they have unity in their
human sources and functionings. Heart and mind are not identical .... But in
the everyday business of living, secular or otherwise, these variant aspects of
personality find inseparable expression in a thousand ways. They cannot be
altogether parted in law more than in life.'
Prince was no anomaly. The free exercise record prior to Sherbert v. Verner27 (of
which Prince was a part) was clear. Religion would not be entitled to special rights
in circumstances where comparable secular claims would be denied.'
Nor did the post-Sherbert, pre-Smith era mark a significant departure from this
rule. Overall, the Court was not generous in granting religious exemptions.29 In only
two instances did the Court expressly approve the granting of special exemptions
exclusively for religious adherents in circumstances where similar claims by
nonreligious claimants would have been denied."0 At the same time, the Court
expressly utilized the Free Exercise Clause to vindicate an equality interest. In
25. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
26. Id. at'164-65 (citation omitted).
27. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
28. The only exceptionto this rule is Follettv. Town ofMcCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944)
(holding that a tax on the sale of books could not be applied to a Jehovah's Witness who
distributed religions materials door-to-door in exchange for contributions).
29. Religious claimants won a total of only five cases, and four ofthose five dealt with the
exact same issue-whether a state could deny unemployment benefits to an applicant whose
failure to be available for work was based uponreligious belief. The unemployment cases are:
Sherbert, 374 U.S. 398, Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981), Hobble v.
UnemploymentAppeals Commission, 480 U.S. 136 (1987), and Frazee v. IllinoisDepartment
of Employment Securities, 489 U.S. 829 (1989). The non-employment insurance case is
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234-36 (1972) (exempting the Amish from compulsory
school requirements).
30. See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707,713-16 (1981) (holding that a person who
objected to working in an armaments factory on religious grounds could not be denied
unemployment compensation benefits, but one who opposed such work on philosophical or
moral grounds could be denied benefits); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 234-36 (holding that an
exemption from compulsory school requirements would be provided to the Amish on free
exercise grounds but would not be available to secular groups seeking a similar exemption).
2000]
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McDaniel v. Paty,3" the Court held that a state could not exclude a member of the
clergy from serving as a legislator or delegate to the state's constitutional
convention.
Smith was simply the logical outgrowth of this history. In classic equal protection
fashion, Smith held that claimants are not entitled to receive exemptions from neutral
laws under the Free Exercise Clause.32 However, religious claimants would be
entitled to reliefupon a showing that the government singled out religion for adverse
treatment.
33
The equality theme is not as pervasive in establishment cases, but even here seeds
of the equality principle were present in the results (ifnot in the rhetoric) of the early
decisions. The first modem Establishment Clause case, Everson v. Board of
Education,' set the tone. Everson began with a flourish of separationist rhetoric:
The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means at least
this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can
pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over
another .... No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any
religious activities or institutions, whateverthey may be called, or whatever form
they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal
Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious
organization or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause
against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of
separation between Church and State.'
35
The Court's holding in the case, however, was far more equality oriented than the
Court's rhetoric would suggest. The state would not be constitutionally prohibited
from providing transportation to parochial school students on an equal basis with the
transportation that it provided to children attending public schools. Undoubtedly,
this aid to the religious school students would make attending parochial school more
affordable, and this cost would indisputably be borne by the taxpayer-but at some
point the equality principle triumphed over the separationist rhetoric.' As the
Everson Court concluded, "[The First Amendment] requires the state to be neutral
in its relations with groups ofreligiousbelievers and nonbelievers; it does not require
the state to be their adversary. State power is no more to be used so as to handicap
religions than it is to favor them.
37
31. 435 U.S. 618, 626-27 (1978).
32. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, at 878-79 (1990).
33. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546
(1993).
34. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
35. Id. at 15-16 (1947) (emphasis in original) (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S.
145, 164 (1878)).
36. See id. at 17.
37. Id. at 18. As Douglas Laycock notes, Everson reflects a tension between the two
establishment approaches that has remained in the jurisprudence ever since. The first suggests
that the state may provide no aid to religion (an approach that is reflected in the rhetoric of
Everson); the second is that the state may not discriminate either in favor of or against
religion (an approach that is reflected in the Everson result). See Douglas Laycock, The
Underlying Unity of Separation and Neutrality, 46 EMoRY L.J. 43,48 (1997).
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Establishment Clause cases since Everson have struggled with essentiallythe same
sorts of distinctions. On one hand, the Court has generally upheld laws which
provide religion withbenefits that are also available to abroad range ofnonreligious
entities. For example, in Walzv. TaxCommission,as the Court upheld church property
tax exemptions that were a part of a broader legislative scheme affording similar tax
benefits to other nonprofit organizations.
On the other hand, in the absence of a broad-based eligibility the Court has struck
down programs that exclusively or primarily benefitted religion, even though there
would have been no constitutional infirmity had similar benefits been granted to a
nonreligious person or entity.39 Thus, in the nativity scene cases, the Court has made
clear that explicit government endorsement of religion would be unconstitutional.'
This is so even though there would ostensibly be no constitutional problem if the
government were to choose to endorse a nonreligious ideology-such as deciding to
erect and maintain a monument to Adam Smith as a tribute to capitalism.4
The general prohibition against aid to parochial education also fits this model. The
state may not support religious teaching-that would be singling out religion for
special benefit. But aspects of the parochial aid cases also track equality concerns.
While the Court has made clear that there are constitutional inhibitions on state-aid
to parochial education, those inhibitions may be overcome if the state offers its aid
in a form that treats religion equally with other beneficiaries.42 For example, if the
aid offered by the state is available to a wide class of beneficiaries that happens to
include parochial students, the program is likely to be upheld (unless it is construed
as supporting religious instruction).' In contrast, if the aid has only a narrow class
of beneficiaries, primarily composed of parochial students, it will be struck down 44
As Frederick Gedicks explains, the Court's pattern is that it will tend to find no
constitutional violation when the state provides benefits to all school children,
including those attending parochial schools, when the aid is directed to a "broad,
secularly defined beneficiary class."0
38. 397 U.S. 664, 672-73 (1970).
39. But see Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (upholding statutory exemption in the civil rights
law which allows religious institutions to discriminate in employment decisions on the basis
of religion).
40. See County ofAllegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573,591-94 (1989); Lynch v. Donnelly,
465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984).
41. Cf Fausto v. Diamond, 589 F. Supp. 451, 468-69 (D.II. 1984) (upholding the
constitutionality of the government supporting and maintaining a memorial to the Unknown
Child).
42. That indeed was the result inEverson, 330 U.S. at 16-18.
43. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
44. This was the basis of the Court's distinction between the tax credit program for
children struck down by the Court in CommitteeforPubic Education & Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,794 (1973), and the tax deduction that was upheld inMuellerv. Allen,
463 U.S. 388, 397-99 (1983). The former program was available only to the parents of
children attending nonpublic schools-a relatively limited class. The latter, however, was
available to the parents of all school children.
45. FREDERICK MARK GEDICKS, THE RHETORIC OF CHURCH AND STATE: A CRrIlcAL
ANALYSIS OF RELIGION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE 52 (1995).
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Recently, of course, the parochial cases have been in especial disorder-with the
Court taking the extraordinary step of reopening and reversing one of its previous
decisions.' But even so, the Court has not deviated from its equality approach. The
tumult in the cases has primarily arisen through the Court's readjusting its
determination as to when a program is one of general availability and/or when it is
one that furthers religious instruction.47
Equality, then, has held a major role within the Establishment Clause equation as
well as in free exercise. While there may be special (and perhaps unequal)
limitations on the extent to which the state may provide specific forms of aid directed
primarily to religious institutions, the state will not be forced to exclude religion
from an otherwise broad category of beneficiaries.
Finally, the Court's commitment to equality (and the ability of the equality
principle to trump establishment concerns) has become most explicit in the Free
Speech Clause cases that have religious overtones. In this line of cases, the Court has
consistently ruled that the state's interest in avoiding Establishment Clause
violations or the appearance of improper state support of religion is not a sufficiently
compelling justification to support the state's refusal to accommodate religious
expression.' Thus, in Capital Square Review &AdvisoryBoard. v. Pinette,49 a Court
plurality held on free speech grounds that the government could not deny the right
of a private group to display a cross on government property, even though the
presence of the cross on public property might create the appearance that the state
was endorsing religion. Similarly, in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the
University of Virginia, the Court required the state to fund a religious student group
on the same terms as it funded nonreligious student organizations, even though the
monies provided might be used to further the group's religious teachings.5"
C. The Limits of Equality
The Court's commitment to the equality approach is not absolute. This is most
apparent in the simple fact that equality has not been used as an explicit rule of
decision in religion clause cases (excepting the religious speech cases noted above).
46. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 208-09, overrulingAguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
47. Compare Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615-21 (1971) (holding that a program
which reimbursed nonpublic schools, including parochial schools, for salaries, textbooks, and
instructional materials in secular courses promoted religious instruction), with Zobrest v.
Catalinia Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 13 (1993), and Agostini, 521 U.S. at 222-30
(rejecting the assumption that providing remedial educational services on parochial school
grounds furthered religious instruction).
48. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 841-46
(1995); Capital Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761-69 (1995);
Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394-95 (1993);
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276 (1981).
49. Capital Square, 515 U.S. 753.
50. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 819.
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Indeed, in many circumstances the Court has explicitly rejected the notion that
religion and nonreligion are to be equated for the purposes of constitutional
analysis.
In fact, there are settled areas of religion clause jurisprudence in which there is no
equivalency. Some have already been alluded to. The Establishment Clause's
prohibition of state funding of institutions or organizations is unique to religion.
5 2
There is no comparable limitation on government funding of nonreligious groups
and activities.'
Similarly, the Establishment Clause's nonendorsement principle recognized inthe
nativity scene cases is also a religion-only limitation. The state may endorse
nonreligious institutions or ideologies if it so chooses.
Third, the nonentanglement principle recognized in Larkin v. Grendel'sDen' and
other cases is also religion-specific. In Larkin, the Court invalidated a provision
which gave a church the right to veto the grant of a liquor license to an
establishment within a five-hundred-foot radius on the grounds that the relationship
between church and state generated by the statute amounted to impermissible
entanglement 55 There would be little constitutional objection, however, if a similar
right was granted to a secular institution.
Fourth, religion is the unique beneficiary of the rule which limits how far the state
may intrude into internal church doctrinal disputes.' Although the Court has not
made clear whether the specific constitutional provision underlying the rule is the
Free Exercise Clause, the Establishment Clause, or some combination of both, the
Court has held that the state is not empowered to decide matters of church doctrine.57
No similar rule bars the state intervention into the internal doctrine of nonreligious
groups.,
51. See supra text accompanying note 5.
52. The concern with state funding of religion may be traced back to James Madision's
Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments written in opposition to a
proposed bill of the Virginia Assembly in 1786 for renewal of tax support for the state's
established church. See Everson v. Board of Educ. 330 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1947).
53. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 92-93 (1976) (holding there was no establishment
limitation on government funding of political campaigns). The Establishment Clause's
limitation on state funding of religious activity is not absolute. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at
837-46 (holding, over defendant's Establishment Clause objection, that the Free Speech
Clause required a universityto fund a studentpublication promoting religious belief according
to the same terms it funded nonreligious student publications).
54. 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
55. Id. at 127.
56. See Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case
of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 CoLuM. L. REv. 1373,
1389 (1981).
57. See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 729 (1871).
58. The limitation on state power to resolve internal church matters has been more broadly
described as a right of church autonomy and would include, for example, a limitation on the
state's ability to regulate church employment decisions. See Laycock, supra note 56, at 1374.
There is some question, however, as to whether this right is religion-specific or whether it is
a more general right available to religious and nonreligious organizations under the First
Amendment's protection of freedom of association. See Ira C. Lupu, Free Exercise Exemption
2000]
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Finally, there are constitutional restrictions that inhibit the state's ability to
determine the bona fides of particular religious claims that do not apply to
nonreligious claims. In United States v. Ballard9 the Court held that in a mail fraud
prosecution in which the defendants had represented themselves as divine
messengers, the jury could not decide that a fraud occurred based upon its own
disbelief of the defendants' religious claims. The determination of whether the
defendants' claims were true was held to be beyond the competence of the Court,
because allowing judicial fact finders to engage in the determination of religious
bona fides would threaten the abilities of persons to believe what they choose-no
matter how incredulous those beliefs may be to others.6"
II. WHEN ARE RELIGION AND NONRELIGION EQUAL?
A. The Equivalency of Religion and
Nonreligion-The Example of Free Exercise
The conclusion that religion should be treated equally with nonreligion is neither
inevitably correct nor inevitably false. As Stephen Smith noted, equality is not self-
defining.6' There are enough similarities between religion and nonreligionto support
their equation, in certain circumstances,62 and there are enough dissimilarities to
justify differential treatment in other situations. As with other equality claims the
question of whether religion should be treated as equal to nonreligion depends upon
the existence (or nonexistence) of sound reason for doing so.63 This Part will offer
some of those reasons.
The policy considerations underlying the equality principle are most convincing
in the context of free exercise claims;' so with that in mind, let us review the facts
and Religious Institutions: The Case of Employment Discrimination, 67 B.U. L. REV. 391,
431-42 (1987).
59. 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944).
60. See id. at 86-87. Ballard indicated that the trier of fact could only find fraud if it
believed the religious claims of the defendants were made insincerely. As Justice Jackson
argued in dissent, however, how could sincerity possibly be shown without reference to the
believability of the defendants' claim? See id. at 92-95 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
61. See Steven Smith, Blooming Confusion: Madison's MixedLegacy, 75 Ind. L.J. 61,65-
70 (2000); see also Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality
Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REv. 993, 995 (1990).
62. I have always been struck, for example, with the fact that even the most ardent free
exercise advocates have acquiesced in the position that religious expression should not be
treated more deferentially than nonreligious expression. If religion is truly different and more
preferred than is nonreligion, then why shouldn't religious speech be entitled to special
protection?
63. See Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARv. L. REv. 537 (1982).
64. Despite my defense of the equality approach here, I have argued that there are sound
reasons why religion and nonreligion should not always be treated as equal in the
establishment context. See William P. Marshall, The Inequality ofAnti-Establishment, 1993
BYU L. REv. 63, 68-71. As I make clear in that piece (or at least attempt to make clear) there
are religion-specific matters at work in the anti-establishment context that have no play infree
exercise. These matters relate to the specific problems that are created when religion attempts
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in a pre-Smith free exercise case-Thomas v. Review Board.5 In Thomas, the Court
was faced with the claim of a Jehovah's Witness that he should be entitled to receive
unemployment compensation benefits because his religious conviction made him
unable to work in an armaments factory." The Court granted him relief under the
Free Exercise Clause. The Court made clear in the course of its holding, however,
that the state could have justifiably withheld unemployment compensation benefits
if Thomas's refusal to work in the armaments factory was based on philosophical or
moral beliefs rather than on religious beliefs. 7 According to the Thomas Court, it
was appropriate to treat the religious claimant and nonreligious claimant differently.
Does such a holding violate religion/nonreligion equality or does it simply stand
for the proposition that religious and nonreligious claimants are not so similarly
situated as to implicate equality concerns? The answer, of course, depends on how
one views the underlying interests.
Arguments could be made (and I have made them frequently)' that a religious
objection to working in an armaments factory and a philosophical or moral objection
to working in an armaments factory are essentially indistinguishable. Religion and
nonreligion simply present two alternative modes of ideology. The soundness of the
position that it is wrong to work in factories that produce war machines does not
depend upon whether the basis of that position is religious or secular. There is
nothing in the substance of the beliefs that suggests that the religious and the secular
objections should be treated differently.
If the premise that religious and nonreligious objections to working in an
armaments factory are equivalent is accepted, then a fair amount follows. First, from
a First Amendment (speech) perspective, granting the religious believer exclusive
benefit violates the equality of ideas principle that lies at the heart of the Free Speech
Clause.69 The equality of ideas principle posits that every idea has equal dignity in
the competition for acceptance in the marketplace of ideas. Protecting only some
ideas (those based on religion) is inappropriate because it improperly skews the
marketplace of ideas in his favor by, in effect, shielding the religious beliefs from
antagonistic social forces. The effect of religion, after all, is not confined to the mind
of the believer. Rather, religion is a powerful social force that frames, shapes, and
influences political responses to a wide range of issues. Specially protecting religious
beliefs, therefore, could have real political consequence. Thomas's pacifism, if
to use the political process to reinforce the purported truths of its own beliefs. For a fuller
explanation of this rationale, see William P. Marshall, The Other Side of Religion, 44
HASTUNGS L.J. 843, 860-63 (1993).
65. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
66. ld. at 710-11.
67. See id. at 713.
68. See William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U.
CJiI.L. REv. 308,320-21 (1991); WilliamP. Marshall, The CaseAgainstthe Constitutionally
Compelled Free Exercise Exemption, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 357, 361 (1990).
69. See Police Dept. v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972); Elena Kagan, The Changing
Faces of First Amendment Neutrality, 1992 Sup. CT. REv. 29, 34-35; Kenneth L. Karst,
Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. Cm. L. REv. 20, 25 (1975);
Geoffrey R. Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of Its Content: The Peculiar Case of
Subject-MatterRestrictions, 46 U. CH. L. REv. 81 (1978).
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accepted by a wide range of people, would have as dramatic an effect on the political
landscape as would the religious beliefs of groups such as those who claim their
religious beliefs forbid their children from being exposed to humanistic material"
or the claim that traditional tribal lands should not be developed."'
Second, from an Establishment Clause perspective, protecting only the religious
objection places an official imprimatur on the religious belief that may violate
establishment concerns against impermissible government endorsement ofreligion. 2
The conclusion that a particular belief is entitled to unique constitutional protection,
after all, would bestow upon that belief a Supreme Court sanctioned credibility and
legitimacy.
The equivalence of the workplace objections of Thomas and his nonreligious
counterpart, moreover, extends beyond their similarity as articulated ideas. Free
exercise exemptions of the kind granted by the Court in Thomas, for example, have
been justified on such grounds as promoting pluralism,' protecting conscience,74
preserving the self-identity of the adherent,7' or saving the believer from the
purported special hardship that occurs when one is forced to violate religious
principles.76 All of these rationales, however, would also serve to equate Thomas
with his secular counterpart rather than distinguish him.7
Consider pluralism. There is no doubt that the values associated withpluralism are
substantial. Intermediate communities such as those fostered by religion provide a
valuable buffer between the state and the individual.' They allow and advance the
flourishing of moral principles,79 and they promote cultural diversity. Pluralism's
attributes, however, do not inhere exclusively within the domain of religious groups.
Secular ethnic, social, or political groups can, and do, serve to further many of the
values associated with pluralism."0 Moreover, if the goal is promoting pluralism,
protecting religious belief is overinclusive. Not all religious belief derives from
religious communities. Many times religion is highly individualistic.8 ' Indeed, the
70. See Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1063-65 (6th Cir. 1987).
71. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439,452 (1988).
72. See Ira C. Lupu, Keeping the Faith: Religion, Equality and Speech in the U.S.
Constitution, 18 CONN. L. REv. 739, 769 (1986) ("Free exercise exemptions from general
regulatory statutes are a form of constitutional tribute to individual acts of faith.").
73. See Carl H. Esbeck, Establishment Clause Limits on Governmental Interference with
Religious Organizations, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 347, 369 (1984).
74. See Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SuP. CT. REv. 1, 15.
75. See Daniel 0. Conkle, Toward a General Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82 Nw.
U. L. Rav. 1113, 1164-65 (1988).
76. See John H. Garvey, Free Exercise and the Values ofReligious Liberty, 18 CONN. L.
REV. 779, 792 (1986).
77. See Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional
Discourse, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 149, 202-18 (1991).
78. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984).
79. See Frederick M. Gedicks, Towards a Constitutional Jurisprudence of Religious
Group Rights, 1989 Wis. L. REv. 99, 116.
80. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619.
81. InFrazee v. Illinois Department ofEmployment Securities, 489 U.S. 829, 831 (1989)
(one of the successful employment insurance cases), the religious belief at issue was wholly
idiosyncratic. Frazee was not a member of any religious sect or church that might serve as his
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believer's objection in the Thomas case itself was not tied to his intermediate
religious community. Evidence in the case established that Thomas's belief that it
was against his religion to work in an armaments factory was based upon his own
particular religious belief and not one that he shared with his faith community.
Indeed, if the nonreligious objector to working in an armaments factory belonged to
a peace group, the vindication of his claim would have furthered pluralism interests
to a greater extent than would the claim of the actual Thomas.
Conscience, as well, is not a uniquely religious concern.' The objections to war
of a moral opponent and a religious opponent can not be distinguished on the
grounds that the latter is based on conscience while the former is not.' Similarly,
religion is not a unique aspect of self-identity. Social affiliations, personal
relationships, and family also play critical roles in the individual's development of
her sense of self. Finally, the conclusion that violations of religions precepts cause
special suffering is both overinclusive and underinclusive. A secular belief that it is
immoral to kill in war may be far more deeply felt than the belief of a religious
adherent that she should not work on Saturdays-and the violation of the moral
belief may be far more excruciating to the secular believer than a violation of the
sectarian principle is to the religious devotee.
B. Does Equivalency Equal Equality?
Note that to this point, I have not made the argument that religious and
nonreligious claims for exemption are equal. Stephen Smith is right. Claiming that
two matters are equal does not make it so.' My claim to this point is only that, in the
free exercise area, religion and nonreligion are arguably functionally equivalent, and
not treating religion and nonreligion equally in certain circumstances also raises its
own set ofpolicy and constitutional concerns. On this basis, I conclude that there are
sensible reasons for treating religion and nonreligion alike-at least in free exercise
exemption cases such as Thomas.
Others disagree. Indeed, there is a growing body of scholarship that, while,
conceding that religion and nonreligion can be equated based upon the secular,
functional arguments offered above,' strenuously argues that religion and
nonreligion are different nonetheless.' The position taken in this scholarship,
straightforwardly enough, is that religion must be understood as being different
intermediate community.
82. See ChristopherL. Eisgruber& Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience:
The Constitutional Bases for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CI-. L. REv. 1245, 1295
(1994); Laura S. Underkuffler-Freund, Yoder and the Question of Equality, 25 CAP. U. L.
Rav. 789, 796 (1996).
83. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 340 (1970).
84. See Smith, supra note 61, at 61-75. There are arguments, however, which do support
this conclusion. See, e.g., infra note 97.
85. See supra text accompanying notes 73-76.
86. See McConnell, supra note 17, at 1151-52; Smith, supra note 77, at 154-55.
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because of distinctly religious concerns-specifically that humanity's relationship
with God should be understood to transcend all other allegiances or activities.' For
the rest of this discussion, I shall refer to this argument as the "sectarian claim."
On one hand, it is difficult to dispute the logic of the sectarian claim. If God does
exist and is knowable, then presumably humanity's obligation and allegiance to him
would be primary.' This, as Soren Kierkegaard teaches us, is the lesson of the story
of Abraham and Isaac." Because Abraham was ordered by God to kill Isaac, he was
compelled to suspend the secular strictures against murder. Abraham's religious
obligation, in short, transcended his temporal duties. Translated into constitutional
law, this means that the state's interest in preventing murder, no matter how
compelling, would be obligated to give way to the divine command."
Closely examined, however, the applicability of the sectarian claim is an
extraordinarily limited assertion. It directly applies only upon a showing that the
religious belief in question is True. The importance of the state's accommodating
Abraham is not because Abraham believes he must kill Isaac; it is because of the
Truth of the command (that he must kill Isaac). If Abraham is misguided, there is
no value in protecting his belief. As Larry Alexander explains, the essence of the
sectarian claim is not that religion is good-it is that "True religion is good."'" But
how is one to know what is True? More importantly, how is the state to accept that
one has found True religion? In this respect, the sectarian claim runs up against the
first amendment prohibition against the states declaring what is religiously True. 2
Given these concerns, it would seem that the sectarian claim has simply led us down
a blind alley.
There is a response. Defenders of the sectarian claim might argue that it is
unnecessary to show that a particular religious claim is True. All they need to show
is that a religious claim might be True. As Michael McConnell has argued, "the
liberal state... cannot reject in principle the possibility that a religion may be
true.. . ."' But the problem with this approach is that a jurisprudence which must
act on the basis that any sincere, religious belief is True would quickly prove
unworkable. The claim that a matter is compelled by Divine Law admits no
87. See John H. GarveyAnAnti-LiberalArgumentforReligiousFreedom, 7 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 275 (1996); Michael Stokes Paulsen, God is Great, Garvey is Good: Making
Sense of Religious Freedom, 72 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 1597, 1611 (1997).
88. See McConnell, supra note 74, at 15.
89. See SOREN KmRKEGAARD, FEAR AND TREMBLING (Howard V. Hong & Edna H. Hong
eds. and trans., Princeton 1983).
90. Some theologians would argue, however, that state strictures need not necessarily give
way even in the face of divine command. According to Stanley Hauerwas, for example, the
meaning and commitment of religious belief is only most fully tested when it is opposed to
secular obligation. See Stanley M. Hauerwas, Freedom ofReligion: A Subtle Temptation, 72
SoUNDiNGs 317, 319, 337 (1989).
91. Larry Alexander, Good God, Garvey! The Inevitability and Impossibility of a
Religious Justification of Free Exercise Exemptions, 47 DRAKE L. REV. 35, 41 (1998)
(emphasis in original).
92. See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679,728 (1871) ("The law knows no heresy,
and is committed to the support of no dogma, the establishment of no sect.").
93. McConnell, supra note 74, at 15.
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possibility of an overriding secular interest. The state, however, cannot suspend the
operations of its laws any time an adherent asserts her religious beliefs are True.
Such an approach truly would create a rule which, as Justice Scalia warned, would
allow every person to be a law unto herself.94
Undoubtedly, the effects of such an approach could be watered down by a
jurisprudential device such as the compelling interest test95 (Abraham could still be
arrested for murder); but would this meet the concerns of the sectarian claim? As
Alexander argues, "why should a compelling secular (state) interest ever override the
interest in satisfying God's commands? From the believer's perspective, God's
commands trump those of the staie, however 'compelling' the latter might seem to
nonbelievers."'
There is a final argument that could be made on behalf of the sectarian claim.
Religion might be distinguished from nonreligion on the conclusory assertion that
religion is different because religion is different. This is not a facetious argument,
nor is it a straw man. Nothing requires that matters that are at times functional
equivalents always be treated as equals. Accordingly, those who believe in the
primacy of religion for its own sake may equally believe that no further justification
of religion's distinctiveness is required. That being so, the position that granting
religious exemptions offends the principle of the equality of ideas would necessarily
fail because, to those who believe in the primacy of religion, there is no equality of
ideas in the firstplace. To those who assert the innate distinctiveness of religion, the
result of the previous analysis equating religion and nonreligion is unlikely to be
persuasive.97
III. THE INEQUALITY PREMISE UNDERLYING EQUALITY
There is, however, another line of argument. As noted previously, there are some
areas in which religion and nonreligion are not treated equally. The state is
precluded, for example, from resolving intrachurch theological disputes98 and/or
determining religious sincerity (by reference to the believability of the religious
claim).99 As shall be discussed, the religion-specific policies underlying these
limitations may also support treating religious claims as equal to nonreligious
94. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990).
95. See Paulsen, supra note 87, at 1623.
96. Alexander, supra note 91, at 42.
97. The constitutional basis underlying the application of the equality principle in free
exercise cases may be stronger than this passage admits. Not only do anti-establishment and
Free Speech Clause policies argue against according religion special treatment but the
contention that there is an innate distinctiveness in religion may also be undercut by the fact
that there is a common historical rationale underlying boththe speech and religion guarantees.
Freedom of speech and freedom of religion were both seen as deserving protection because
of the part they played in the search for truth. See William P. Marshall, In Defense of the
Searchfor Truth as aFirstAmendment Justification, 30 GA. L. REV. 1, 12-19 (1995); see also
Daniel 0. Conkle, Secular Fundamentalism, Religious Fundamentalism, and the Search for
Truth in Contemporary America, 12 J.L. & REL. 337, 354 (1995-96).
98. See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713 (1976).
99. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944).
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claims. It is the distinctiveness of religion that arguably counsels that it be treated
as equal with nonreligion. This Part will investigate this position.
Both the limitation on civil court adjudication of intrachurch disputes and upon
the determination of religious sincerity reflect the special sensitivity that is required
whenever the state adjudicates matters involving religion. Some of these concerns
are constitutionally based. Adjudicating religious sincerity on the basis of whether
the asserted religious belief is True, for example, would place the state in the
position of declaring what is religious Truth-a power that both inserts the state in
the quintessential religious role, inviolation of Establishment Clause principles, and
that usurps the church's own essential function, in derogation of free exercise
concerns.
100
Concern about the competency of civil courts to resolve issues with religious
implications is also a factor.' In the intrachurch dispute context, for example, the
Court as early as 1871 expressed the concern that civil courts resolving religions
matters would in effect permit an appeal "from the more learned tribunal in the law
which should decide the case, to one which is less so.""' But the competency
concern is not simply with getting a doctrinal issue right. After all, civil courts are
frequently called upon to decide matters of foreign law with which they have no
particular expertise. 3 Rather the competing concern is that adjudicating religious
matters, unlike foreign law, involves a series of interpretive decisions that are
generally beyond the ken, or at least beyond the common experience, of the civil
tribunals.1
4
A. Free Exercise
Consider, for example, what a free exercise regime that treated religion
distinctively would require of adjudicating courts. The court would need to determine
(1) whether the alleged belief was religious; (2) whether the believer was sincere in
100. The objection to state declarations of religious Truth also lies at the heart of Thomas
Jefferson's seminal and influential A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom. The Bill
asserts that allowing states the power to proclaim true beliefs leads to the maintenance of
false religions and interferes with the individual's right to pursue religious truth on her own
accord. Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, in 2 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 545 (Julian P. Boyd & Lyman H. Butterfield eds., 1950).
101. Part of this problem stems with the nature of religion. Religion is boundless in the
sense that there are no human activities that cannot be claimed to be religious exercise or
religiously motivated. As Mircea Eliade has argued, "we cannot be sure that there is
anything-object, movement, psychological function, being or even game-that has not at
some time in human history been transformed into a hierophany [expression of the sacred]."
MiRCEA EUADE, PATiERNS IN COMPARATIVE RELIGION 11-12 (Rosemary Sheed trans.,
University of Neb. Press 1996) (1958) (emphasis in original); see also State v. Hodges, 695
S.W.2d 171, 171-72 (Tenn. 1985) (claimant asserted that religious conviction required him
to dress like a chicken when going to work); E. WAsHBuRNHoPKINs, ORIGINANDEVOLUTION
OF RELIGION 13 (1923) ("Man has worshipped everything on earth .....
102. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 729 (1871).
103. See LEA BmmAYER, CONFLICTS OF LAWS 13-17 (2d ed. 1995).
104. See Ira C. Lupu, The Failure ofRFRA, 20 U. ARY. LrrrLE ROCK. L.J. 575,593 (1998).
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her religious claim (an inquiry which we have seen must be limitedby constitutional
concerns); 05 (3) what role the particular religious belief has in the believer's
religious order;0 6 (4) whether the religious exercise was burdened by the state
enactment;' and (5) what the religious effect that violating the religious norm will
have on the believer. These are extraordinarily difficult questions with no easily
ascertainable standards available for application.' Indeed, the notion that such
inquiries could be standardized across religious traditions may itself offend religious
liberty concerns by placing religious belief and practice into cookie-cutter modes." 9
There is, after all, no religion archetype. The importance of doctrine, the sources of
religious obligation, and the consequence ofviolating religious norms, to name but
some indicia of belief, all vary among religions and religious traditions. Addressing
religious claims on religious terms, in short, would ultimately require developing a
separate set of standards with respect to each religion. Indeed if the Supreme Court
is to be taken at its word, that it is the personal beliefs of the individual that trigger
free exercise protection and not the formal doctrine of the religion to which the
believer adheres,"0 then a separate set of standards would need to be applied to each
believer.
Moreover, it is not only that the judicial task is so difficult, it is also that the
implications of error are so great. Defining religion incorrectly, for example, can
raise its own establishment and free exercise concerns."' It is therefore no wonder
105. See supra text accompanying notes 59-60.
106. Whether a particular belief was central to a claimant's belief system was never an
announced part of the compelling interest test but it infactbecame apart ofthe jurisprudence.
Accordingly, Justice Scalia in Smith relied on the difficulty in applying a centrality analysis
as one of the reasons militating against the continuing application of the Sherbert test.
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886-87 (1990); see also Joanne C. Brant, Taking
the Supreme Court at Its Word: The Implications for RFRA and Separation of Powers, 56
MONT. L. REV. 5, 16 n.42 (1995).
107. See generally Lupu, supra note 19, at 959 (arguing that the concept of "burden" as a
threshold is an easy way out for courts that do not want to delve into theological or spiritual
constructs).
108. See id. at 957 ("Theologians, sociologists, and others have struggled ... with
definitional questions, but have hardly approached anything resembling agreement on what
constitutes religion or religious belief.").
109. See ELIADE, supra note 101, at 1-2 ("[A]s soon as you start to fix limits to the notion
of sacred you come upon difficulties-difficulties both theoretical and practical .... We are
faced with rites, myths, divine forms, sacred and venerated objects, symbols, cosmologies,
theologumena, consecrated men, animals and plants, sacred places, and more .... We have
to deal with a vast and ill-sorted mass of material .... ).
110. See Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 832-35 (1989);
Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 715-16 (1981).
111. Free exercise concerns, for example, are created ifthe religious claimant is improperly
adjudicated to be nonreligious, and establishment issues generated by improperly granting,
or denying, the official imprimatur of the courts on whether a religion is bona fide. See
generally United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.2 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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that Justice Scalia in Smith relied upon judicial competency concerns in holding that
the Free Exercise Clause did not demand constitutionally compelled exemptions
from neutral laws for religious believers.'
Additionally, even if the courts are in some sense competent to address religion
related issues, there is considerable doubt as to whether they are likely to do so in a
way that serves (or at least fairly serves) religious libertyvalues. First, minoritybelief
systems will undoubtedly be the worse for wear. A court is far more likely to be
sympathetic to claims that are consistent with dominant cultural norms than with
religious claims that seem bizarre or incredulous.' 3 Second, as the pre-Smith free
exercise"' and the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act ("RFRA")" 5 cases attest,
courts will be likely to under-enforce religious exemption claims because of the
difficult interpretive steps that religion claims require."6
Finally, even if the courts do all in their power to factor away cultural preferences
and guard against under-enforcement the resulting jurisprudence will likely still
appear jumbled. This is because of the range of differences among and between
religions and religious beliefs. Let me offer an illustration.
Assume for the moment that there are five different religious landlords all of
whom object to having to rent to unmarried couples under an equal housing
ordinance. Claimant A's objection is central to her religion and has doctrinal
support; Claimant B's objection is based upon a principle in her faith that unmarried
people should not live together, but the religion is silent on the question of whether
112. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886-87 & n.4. (1990). For an excellent
account of the significance of the judicial competency concern in the Smith decision, see
Brant, supra note 106.
113. See Lupu, supra note 19, at 92-95 (arguing that decisionmakers may doubt the
sincerity of an unusual or bizarre belief leading to the result that those religions most needing
constitutional protection may be most disadvantaged); see also United States v. Ballard, 322
U.S. 78, 92-95 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (expressing concern that fact finders will tend
to judge the believability of a religious belief when asked to determine whether a belief is
sincerely held); Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, supra note 82, at 1283-84
(noting the difficulties inherent in asking members of one faith to understand the religious
beliefs and practices of those of other faiths).
114. See Ryan, supra note 18, at 1416-37.
115. See Lupu, supra note 104, at 593.
116. Professor Lupu presents a number of reasons why claims for religious exemptions are
likely to fail. As he states:
Religion cases may be different [from other exemption cases] for a variety of
reasons. First, judges drawn from America's highly educated elite, may be
skeptical about intensely held religious commitments. Second, they may be
sensitive to the possibility of religious fraud, difficult for government to uncover
without using intrusive measures. Third, some judges perceive a danger of
Establishment Clause violations hanging over the project of religious
exemptions. Fourth (and related to the first three), judges may sense the dangers
of bias in whatever they do... and they will know that it is very difficult to
separate those biases from the project ofjudging exemption claims. Better no
exemptions, they might well say, than a pattern of exemptions riddled by
religious favoritism.
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renting to such couples is a religious violation; Claimant C's objection is based upon
an idiosyncratic belief that the claimant adopted at the time the unmarried couple
applied for an apartment; Claimant D's objection is based upon religious tenet, but
her religion does not indicate that there are any adverse religious consequences for
violating the belief; and Claimant E's objection is based upon discussions she has
had with other members of her religious community. Assume that the state's interest
is found to be significant but not so "compelling" that it would outweigh all
challenges. Inthis circumstance, courts evaluating the factors ofreligiosity, sincerity,
centrality, burden, and effect could, and likely should, come out differently in these
cases. But how the cases would result is not predictable. As we have seen, the nature
of religious belief and conviction is not easily universalized and there is no common
(or at least readily apparent) baseline from which courts could promote a consistent
approach that accounts for the myriad forms of religious belief and attachment.
Moreover, as if this were not enough, the inconsistency created by the inherent
variability within religious belief would be compounded by litigation factors such as
the nature of the evidence proffered and the identity of the trier of fact.
But even if all variables were eliminated to the fullest extent possible, imagine the
resulting case law, in which some of the religious landlord claimants win while
others fail. Should the same religious belief (or what appears to be the same religious
belief) be treated differently? And if so, would not the resulting appearance of sect
preference create its own set of concerns?
Treating religion as distinct, at least in the context of free exercise claims for
exemption, in short, is a recipe for instability. It demands inquiries that are fraught
with constitutional peril, it places extraordinary demands on civil tribunals, it leads
to ajurisprudence that would likely favor mainstream beliefs, and it would create the
appearance of sect favoritism. The equality approach, on the other hand, avoids these
pitfalls.
B. Establishment
Institutional concerns play a more limited role in supporting the use of the equality
approach in establishment cases. After all, establishment cases only rarely raise the
need for defining religion"7 and virtually never require investigations into sincerity,
centrality, burden, and effect. Nevertheless, the interest in avoiding sensitive
religious determinations can, and has, had some role in establishment cases.
The best example of this may be found in Widmar v. Vincent."8 In Widmar a
religious group was denied permission to engage in prayer meetings in university
buildings, although nonreligious organizations were allowed access to the university
facilities. The university defended its actions on anti-establishment grounds,
contending that its decision to exclude the prayer meetings was compelled by the
Establishment Clause. The Court found for the religious organization holding that
the university restriction was a classic form of content discrimination and therefore
117. See Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 199-200 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding that the teaching
of Transcendental Meditation in public schools violated the Establishment Clause by
inculcating religion).
118. 454 U.S. 263, 275-77 (1981).
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prohibited by the Free Speech Clause."' But it is the Court's particular treatment of
prayer that, for our purposes, is most interesting. In a dramatic example of the
equality approach, the Court refused to accept the argument that prayer was different
than any other form of speech. 2
From a religious perspective, however, worship is different than speech. To
believers, worship is less a verbal activity than it is a most sacred and profound
religious act. As Mark Tushnet explains, worship is a "means by which believers
affirm to each other and to their god their participation in a community set apart
from others."'' As such, worship is not as much an act of communication to the
outside world as it is an act of "commitment to a community."'"
Worship thus "captures something deeply important about religion" that the
Widmar Court chose to ignore." But how could the Court do otherwise coherently?
As the Court explained, the question of whether a particular action, such as reading
from the Bible, should be characterized as speech or worship was not a
determination that could be made intelligibly."4 Accordingly, the Court faced the
alternative of either reflexively treating worship as speech or inserting itself (and the
lower courts to follow) in the tasks of providing secular interpretation and secular
appraisals of religious significance to a fundamentally religious act. As in the free
exercise area, the equality approach allowed the Court to avoid the type of perilous
inquiry for which it was ill-equipped.
The decision in idmar not to employ religion-specific analysis is also consistent
with the Court's approach in McDaniel v. Paty. " In McDaniel the Court addressed
the constitutionality of a Tennessee provision disqualifying clergy from holding
public office. Tennessee defended the statute on establishment policy grounds,
arguing that the disqualification statute would assure the separation of church and
state because clergy would not be able to disassociate their religious conviction from
their secular obligations.2 The Court rejected the defense. As it stated: "[The
American experience provides no persuasive support for the fear that clergymen in
public office will be less careful of anti-establishment interests or less faithful to their
oaths of civil office than their unordained counterparts." 27 Clergy office-holders and
lay office-holders were to be treated equally.
The McDaniel approach, however, should be contrasted with the Court's ill-fated
effort inAguilar v. Felton."8 InAguilar, the Court addressed the constitutionality of
New York City's implementation of a program authorizing federal remedial
assistance to low-income, educationally needy students. The challenged program
provided remedial services to parochial school students by sending public employees
119. See id. at 270-75.
120. Only Justice White dissented on this point. White argued that "verbal acts ofworship"
were not the same as other "verbal acts." Id. at 285 (White, J., dissenting).
121. Tushnet, supra note 3, at 719.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269 n.6.
125. 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
126. See id. at 628.
127. Id. at 629.
128. 473 U.S. 402 (1985), overruled by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
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on to the grounds ofthe parochial schools. Utilizing a religion-specific approach, the
Aguilar Court held that the program was unconstitutional because the pervasive
religious atmosphere in parochial schools meant that any instruction within the
school might become imbued with religious overtones. 29 This, accordingly, would
violate the Establishment Clause's prohibition against funding religious instruction.
There was at least one obvious problem with the Aguilar Court's conclusion,
however. The record in the case indicated that, in the nineteen years of the
program's existence, there had been no instance in which the instructors funded
under the program actually engaged in religious teaching."'0 The Court's religion-
specific assumption, therefore, was not grounded in reality, but was instead based
upon a misbegotten appraisal of religion's effects on secular trained professionals
working within a religion institution-an appraisal which, as Douglas Laycock has
argued, may have been influenced by a latent suspicion of Catholic schools.1
3 1
Aguilar, in effect, is a case study in favor of the equality approach. When secular
courts attempt to understand religion and religion's effects there is both the risk of
objective error and the risk of error caused by bias and misconceptions.3 2
IV. THE PRESUMPTION OF EQUALITY
Thus far, two separate lines of defense have been offered in support of the equality
approach. The first is substantive. There are sound constitutional and policy
justifications that support equating religion with nonreligion. 3 The second is
juridical. Concerns with adjudicating religion as a distinct phenomenon mitigate in
favor of the equality approach, because the equality approach necessarily avoids the
intractable problems inherent in differentiating between religion and nonreligion. ' -
Both of these lines of defense are admittedly limited. Neither support the use of
religion/nonreligion equality as a universal rule for the religion clause cases. The
substantive line of defense, quite obviously, depends upon the existence of sound
rationales for equating religion and nonreligion; but the same rationales do not apply
in all religion clause controversies. The fact that there are reasons to equate religion
and nonreligion in one context does not mean those same reasons exist in another. 135
The substantive argument, thus, requires that the use of equality be justified in each
129. The assumption that the atmosphere within religious schools would affect the ability
of state-paid personnel to provide secular services without religious overtones did not begin
withAguilar. See Wolnan v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229,247 (1977).
130. See Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 424 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
131. See Laycock, supra note 37, at 58.
132. Twelve years later, inAgostini v. Felton, the Court, applying the equality approach,
reversedAguilar. 521 U.S. 203,234-38 (1997). Abandoning its religion-specific assumptions
regarding instruction within religious school buildings, the Court held that state-funded
remedial instruction to parochial school children onparochial school grounds was permissible
because it was part of a larger program which provided remedial education to disadvantaged
children in all schools-public, private, and parochial. Id. at 234-35.
133. See supra Part II.A.
134. See supra Part I.
135. See supra note 64 (contrasting the role ofequality in free exercise and establishment).
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case and explicitly concedes that the equality approach should not apply when
substantive policies lead otherwise.
The juridical concern is also not universal. First, not every religion clause case
presents adjudication problems. Ifa state were to declare Presbyterianism as the state
religion, for example, there would be no problem in religious definition. Second,
although the juridical concern is significant, its role should not be overstated. For
better or worse, sensitive inquiries into the sincerity and nature of an individual's
religious belief cannot be totally avoided,'36 and creating a jurisprudence designed
to eliminate this concern would be futile. The recognition of the juridical concerns
inherent in religion-specific adjudication, accordingly, may be useful in guiding the
construction of religion clause jurisprudence but it should not serve as its
foundation. 37
Is there, then, a broader defense for the equality approach? Let me tentatively
suggest that there may be. Earlier I agreed with Steven Smith's point that assuming
religion and nonreligion should be treated equally, without offering sound rationales
as to why they should be treated equally, would create a hollowjurisprudence. -1 The
equality claim, in short, must have content.
The reverse, however, is also true. Claiming that religion and nonreligionshould
not be treated equally is hollow unless that claim also is supported by sound
justification. The inequality claim must have content as well.
But what about the case in which there are sound policy arguments behind each
position-that is, where strong arguments exist both supporting, and opposing, the
equality claim? What role should the equality approach have in those cases?
The Court may already have answered this question, at least if Rosenberger v.
Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia'39 is any indication. At issue in
Rosenberger was the constitutionality of a University of Virginia policy authorizing
student funds to be allocated to cover the printing costs of student publications except
for those publications that promoted religious belief. The plaintiffs argued that the
failure of the University to fund the religious publication on the same terms that it
funded nonreligious student publications violated the Free Speech Clause's
prohibition against content based discrimination. 4 ' The defendant University, in
turn, argued that its policy was mandated by the Establishment Clause's prohibition
on government funding of core religious activity.' 4'
136. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) (religious definition required by
statutory exemption); see also Williams v. Bright, 658 N.Y.S.2d 910, 912 (1997) (allowing
judicial inquiry into religious belief necessitated by mitigation claim in tort case).
137. See generally Thomas C. Berg, Religion Clause Anti-Theories, 72 NoTRE DAME L.
RFv. 693 (1997) (criticizing religion clause commentary that would abandon efforts to
construct a coherent approach to religion clause issues because of the apparent insolubility
of religion clause issues).
138. See Smith, supra note 77, at 180-96.
139. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
140. See id. at 827.
141. See id. at 863 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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Both sides had powerful arguments at their disposal. 42 The plaintiffs contended
that by excluding from funding only those publications that promoted religious
belief, the University had skewed the marketplace of ideas in a manner that favored
nonreligious and irreligious speech." In contrast, the University asserted that,
because the religious publication served no secular educational function, its speech
could not be construed as equal to the speech presented in other publications144 and
that, in any event from a historical perspective, the direct funding of religious
preaching was at the core of establishment prohibition.'45 Funding religious speech
was not the same as funding nonreligious speech.
The Court in a five-to-four decision ruled for the plaintiffs. Given the strength of
the arguments on both sides of the case, however, the real significance of the
decision may be in revealing that in the equality/inequality debate, close cases will
be decided in favor of equal treatment." Accordingly, Rosenberger may reflect that
the Court maintains an implicit presumption in favor of the equality approach.
The question is whether this presumption (if it does indeed exist 47) is defensible.
I believe it is for one salient reason. It promotes doctrinal stability. As has been noted
by others, the problems inherent in achieving a coherent religion clause
142. See Laycock, supra note 37, at 65 (observing thatRosenbergerpresented a controversy
at the core of both the non-aid and nondiscrimination theories of the Establishment Clause
that had been in tension since Everson).
143. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831.
144. In accord with Free Speech Clause terminology, the University described its policy as
a subject matter distinction and not as a viewpoint distinction. See id. at 830-31.
145. In the words of the dissent "Using public funds for the direct subsidization of
preaching the word is categorically forbidden under the Establishment Clause, and if the
Clause was meant to accomplish nothing else, it was meant to bar this use of public money."
Id. at 868 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing James Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance
Against Religious Assessments to support bar on "usel] of public funds for religious
purposes").
146. The Court did attempt to narrow its holding by suggesting that the Establishment
Clause's policy against state funding of religious activity was not fully implicated in the case
because (1) the funds were paid to the publication's printer and not to the religious group and
(2) that the funds came from student activity fees rather than the state's general tax
assessments. The relevance of these two factors, however, may not be apparent to anybody.
See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 37, at 67.
147. A review of the cases might suggest some ambiguity on this point The Court has
clearly allowed equality concerns to trump religion-specific considerations. See Zobrest v.
Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993); Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of
Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 (1990); Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474
U.S. 481 (1986); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263
(1981); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970);
Everson v. Board. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). But the Court has not followed the equality
approach in other instances. See Thomas v. Review Bd, 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). It is unclear whether the Court viewed any of these cases as
instances where the policies underlying the prevailing positionwere seen as stronger than the
competing claim or whether the Court viewed the strength of the policies on both sides as
being commensurate and allowed the use of equality presumption as a tie-breaker. More
likely, the Court has not explicitly focused on the issue in these terms.
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jurisprudence are extraordinarily difficult and pervasive. The problems, moreover,
extend beyond the juridical concerns with adjudicating religion as a distinct
phenomenon noted in the previous Part (although those certainly play a part). They
also include, for example, the fact that constitutional law is individualistic while
religion is often communitarian,"' thus raising the square peg/round hole dilemma.
And there is the inescapable dilemma ofthe religion clauses: that complete neutrality
towards religion is impossible. The act of deciding religion clause cases necessarily
requires the adoption of a posture towards religion that will itself hold inherent
religious implication.49
In these circumstances, some connection to less problematic inquiries maybe both
desirable and appropriate. Enter equality. The advantage of the equality approach is
that it provides a baseline from which the constitutionality of the treatment of
religion can be adjudged-the baseline of nonreligion. Although the treatment of
religion and nonreligion may vary when policies demand, the equality approach
provides a center of gravity, assuring that the inherent vagaries in religion clause
jurisprudence do not take the case law beyond accessible standards.
V. CONCLUSION-RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AT THE DAWN OF A NEW MILLENNIUM
If the purpose of entitling this Symposium "Religious Liberty at the Dawn of a
New Millennium" was to prod the participants into evaluating the current state of
religious liberty in the United States, then the consensus among us should be that the
state of religious liberty is strong. As Professor Stein has shown us, religion in the
United States is thriving.5" The United States remains one of the most religious
countries in the world... and there is little of the sectarian' strife that plagues much
of the rest of the world. Diverse religions are flourishing and, as Professor Stein
observes, the pace of this religious flourishing is accelerating.'
Interestingly, most of this religious prospering has occurred under a
jurisprudential regime that has tended to minimize religion's distinctiveness and
148. See Tushnet, supra note 3, at 734-35 (arguing that the reason underlying the
"incoherence in the constitutional law of religion [is that it] is founded on a tradition we no
longer fully understand").
149. See Larry Alexander, Liberalism, Religion, and the Unity of Epistemology, 30 SAN
DIEGo L. REv. 763, 792-94 (1993); see also Nomi M. Stolzenberg, "He DrewA Circle That
Shut Me Out": Assimilation, Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal Education, 106
Huv. L. REv. 582, 627 (1993) (noting that to religious fundamentalists, the secular position
thatreligion should be excluded from the pubic schools is religiously-laden). Butsee Kathleen
M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CuI. L. REV. 195, 221 (1992) (arguing
there is no dilemma in a liberal, secular understanding of religion).
150. See Stephen J. Stein, Religion/Religions in the United States: Changing Perspectives
and Prospects, 75 IND. L.J. 37, 52-54 (2000); see also PRINCETONRELIGIONRESEARCHCTR.,
REuGIONiNAmEcA (1996) (90% ofAmericans believethatreligion is either very important
or fairly important in their own lives); A. JAMES RBicHLEY, RELGION iNAMmCAN PUBLIC
LiFE (1985); Frank McCourt, God in America; When You Think of God What Do You See,
LIFE, Dec. 1998, at 60 (96% of Americans believe in God).
151. See Stein, supra note 150, at41
152. See id.
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importance. As we have seen, the Court has only weakly recognized religion as
distinctive under the Establishment Clause and has virtually eliminated a distinctive
accord for religion under the Free Exercise Clause. Accordingly, there may yet be
one remaining argument in defense of the equality approach-it works. Causal
relationships should not be too easily claimed; but given the robust state of religion
at the dawn of the new millennium, the questionposed by this Article, deserves some
consideration. What is the matter with equality?

